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 Abstract—This  paper  presents  a  novel  robot  control 
architecture  for  use  with  personal  robots,  and  argues  its 
potential for improving the safety of these types of system, when 
compared to existing  approaches.  The proposed architecture 
design separates the control system into two distinct areas, one 
area  responsible  for  safe  operation  and  the  other  for 
coordinating  tasks.   The  architecture  design  is  formed  in  a 
hierarchical  structure,  composed  of  low-level  deliberative 
control modules and high-level behavioural safety modules.  It 
is argued that as a result of removing safety considerations from 
the design of task routines, increasingly complex tasks can be 
completed safely, which are both more flexible to environmental 
changes and easier to coordinate.
I. INTRODUCTION
ach decade since the 1970's it has been said that, in 10 
years  time  people  working  with  robots  would  be 
common place in both industry and at home. Although the 
question of why this hasn't happened yet is being continually 
asked,  the  answer  has  changed  over  the  years.  With  the 
development of new engineering techniques, miniaturisation 
of  electronics  and  the  increase  of  computing  power, 
designers  are  now  at  the  stage  where  a  robot  system  is 
capable of performing useful cooperative tasks with human 
users. However, the problem which designers now face, and 
for which the deployment of robot systems is being impeded, 
is  that  of  safety.  Safety  implications  have  always  been  a 
concern for robot designers and traditionally the solution has 
been to prevent the user coming into contact with the robot, 
by  means  of  physical  barriers.   For  personal  robots  to 
become a reality these barriers will need to be removed and 
more dynamic flexible safety methods introduced.
E
In  this  paper  we present  an  investigation  into  different 
types  of  robot  control  architectures  and  propose  a  new 
architecture model, which aims to address a number of key 
deficiencies  found  in  other  architecture  types.   The 
architecture design focuses on safety and aims to separate the 
task  control  of  the  robot  from control  routines  associated 
with safety.   The motivation for this design is the premise 
that safety control should be treated as a separate constant 
process, running in parallel with other robot activities.  It is 
argued  that  in  this  way  the  robot  control  designer  can 
appropriately separate reactive and deliberative components 
of the controller design, which can be a difficulty of existing 
architecture types.
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A. Background
Early  research  [1]  into  the  safety  of  personal  robots 
suggested that industrial robots could be adapted and used to 
perform human-robot  interactive (HRI)  tasks.  However,  as 
Alami et al. [2] discusses, it is not feasible to take a large 
rigid robot and adapt it to the delicate tasks necessary for a 
personal  robot.   At  present,  the  main method for  making 
robots  safe  is  to  prevent  people  from  stepping  into  the 
working  area  of  the  robot.  This  approach,  developed  by 
manufacturing industries, maintains a clear space around the 
robot. Access is prevented by means of physical barriers and 
proximity sensors, which halt the robot on activation [3].  It  
is apparent that if robots are to interact directly with humans, 
a new approach to safety is needed.
All industries,  which require the development of safety-
critical  systems, have strict  processes and standards which 
must be followed before the system can be put into service. 
However, as discussed by Desantis et al. [4] and Kulic and 
Croft  [5],  there  are  still  no  safety  standards  for  complex 
robots for use in cooperative situations with humans.
One objective of robot  design, which every engineering 
designer strives to achieve, is that of intrinsic safety. Intrinsic 
safety is the property that a system cannot inherently cause a 
hazard, even if it fails or malfunctions. In robotics there are a 
number of  well  established  intrinsic  safety techniques [6], 
[7]:
• Actuators with limited power/speed which guarantee 
safe behaviour in case of a fault
• De-energised brakes, which halt the robot in the event 
of a power failure
• The  use  of  a  'dead  man's  switch',  which  must  be 
engaged in order for the robot to operate
Although an intrinsically safe design is what designers aim 
to achieve,  it  can be difficult  to prove this for  a  complex 
system by means of testing.  Therefore,  designs which are 
said to be intrinsically safe,  are generally functionally and 
physically simple. 
Research by Marzwell [8], reveals two classes of potential 
hazards that can exist in robot controllers. These are 'system 
level' failures, caused by the controller itself, and 'task level' 
failures,  which  are  caused  by  valid  commands  to  the 
controller  that  result  in  an  unsafe  event  i.e.  collision, 
unbalancing or other hazards. To alleviate some of the issues 
associated with traditional  controller  designs,  a  number of 
new approaches have been developed. The most popular of 
which,  is  to  modularise  a  system  into  a  group  of  inter-
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connected units that can be developed and tested in isolation. 
As  Laibinis  and  Troubitsyna  [9]  identify,  "Traditionally 
abstraction,  modularisation  and  layered  architecture  are 
recognised  to  be  effective  ways  to  manage  system 
complexity".
The  remainder  of  the  paper  will  focus  on  modular 
hierarchical based robot control architectures.
B. Related Work
The latest research into the safety of personal robots [10], 
[2], [7] argues that it  is not possible to control  a complex 
robot  system in  a  dynamic  environment,  using  traditional 
control  methods.  Instead  they  suggest  a  behavioural  type 
system, which can react and adapt to changing conditions.  
Research by Bensalem et al. [10] and Lussier et al. [11], 
has shown that a hierarchical approach to system safety, with 
different  control  layers  providing planning,  task execution 
and  safety  supervision,  can  improve  the  reliability  and 
dependability of an autonomous robot system. This research 
is  broadly  based  on  the  behaviour-based  techniques 
developed by Rodney Brooks. In Brooks' work [12], [13], he 
demonstrated  how  different  simple  behaviours  could  be 
combined  to  produce  new complex  behaviours.  Both  the 
Subsumption  type  architecture  and  'three  layer'  control 
architecture can be seen in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1: Subsumption architecture and 'three layer'
control architecture [14].
A notable architecture using the three layer  approach is 
the LAAS architecture shown in figure 1.2. This architecture 
divides the software controlling the robot into three levels: 
decisional; execution; functional. The distinct feature of the 
LAAS  architecture  is  the  functional  level,  which 
encapsulates  groups  of  sensors  into  modules  which  can 
communicate with other modules via a service link.
Figure 1.2: LAAS architecture [14].
The  abstraction  of  the  functional  elements  of  the  robot 
control software, allows for modules to be added, removed 
and  amended  while  retaining  control  functionality  of  the 
robot.
The research of this paper seeks to build on the research 
into hierarchical modular control architectures and adapt it 
for use as a safety control architecture for HRI robots.  This 
will be expanded on in the following sections.
C. The Research
This  paper  presents  initial  research  into  a  new type  of 
robot control  architecture design.  The aim of which is to 
produce  a  dynamic  control  system  capable  of  adapting 
control  routines  to  maintain  safety,  while  continuing  to 
perform  useful  tasks.   The  architecture  design  has  been 
developed by analysing the strengths and weaknesses of a 
number of other control systems.
This  research  will  focus  on  the  safety  of  human-robot 
interaction with a class of robots that pose a risk based on 
their  physical  size,  strength and  behaviour.  Although it  is 
noted that there are safety concerns with smaller robots, such 
as  the  iRobot  Roomba  vacuum cleaning  robot.  The  risks 
associated with these types of robot are such that they can be 
developed  using  the  same  safety  criteria  as  other  small 
electrical devices [6], [2].
The  intended  application  for  this  research,  is  for  robot 
systems that are used in both industry and the home, where 
the  robot  would  be  working  on  cooperative  tasks  with  a 
human user. These tasks could be anything from, cooking, 
building flat-pack furniture or helping the stocking of shop 
shelves.  Particular  focus  will  be  made on  multi-functional 
robots, which can perform a variety of tasks, as it is asserted 
that  these  types  of  robots  would  have  all  the  safety 
consideration  of  task-specific  robots  with  additional 
considerations due to their generalised design.
D. Research Questions
Based on the review of current research and preliminary 
experimentations,  the  following  questions  have  been 
formulated:
• To what extent must individual behaviour modules be 
adapted,  in  order  to  maintain  safety in  the  face  of 
changing environments and/or machine dynamics?
• By  purely  suppressing  perceivably  unsafe  control 
actions,  is  it  possible  to  complete  a  task  while 
avoiding hazards? 
• Is  it  possible  to  design  a  robotic  system based  on 
separate  safety  and  task  modules,  where  the  task 
modules  can  be  changed  and  the  safety  modules 
remain unaltered and the safety uncompromised?
• To what extent do the relative priorities of tasks need 
to  be  changed,  in  order  to  maintain  safety in  HRI 
tasks?
• Can a  robotic  system be  designed  which  can  learn 
how to complete tasks safely?
II.ROBOT CONTROL ARCHITECTURES
Robot  control  architectures  can be  broadly divided  into 
one  of  three  categories:  deliberative;  reactive  and  hybrid 
[15].  A  deliberative  controller  uses  the  sense-plan-act 
method for completing tasks. This involves reasoning about 
the perceived world and acting appropriately. This contrasts 
to reactive controllers, which employ a sense-act approach. 
This  approach  avoids  processing  and  storage  overheads, 
often associated with reasoning about the state of the world, 
both  internal  and  external  to  the  robot.  The  final  type  of 
robot controller,  the hybrid controller,  is a combination of 
both the deliberative and reactive controller types. 
Many argue that a hybrid controller type provides the only 
way  to  control  a  robot  performing  complex  tasks  in  a 
dynamic  environment  [16],  [17].  As  Bonasso  and 
Kortenkamp [18] discusses, a control architecture is needed 
which can accept new tasks and information and react to the 
world  at  any time;  "We  do  not  want  an  architecture  that 
requires  a  robot  to  be  reprogrammed  each  time  its  goal 
changes."  [18].  Equally  robot  controllers  that  are  purely 
reactive  are  not  able  to  complete  complex  tasks  which 
require coordination and planning. As Martin Proetzsch [16] 
states, "the problem of controlling complex robotic systems 
is not solved by the behaviour-based paradigm alone. Rather, 
while  helping  with  some  common  problems,  behaviour-
based architectures introduce new difficulties.".
A. Hybrid Architectures
Hybrid  robot  control  architectures  generally  divide  the 
controlling task into reactive and deliberative modules, with 
a  communication  layer  in-between  to  organise  control 
events. The diagram in figure 2.1 is a typical representation 
of a hybrid control architecture. 
Figure 2.1: 3 tier control architecture [19].
The  majority  of  robot  control  architectures  [10],  [17], 
[18],  which have separate safety modules,  use deliberative 
control  modules  for  completing  tasks  and  reactive  safety 
modules to monitor the behaviour of the robot and prevent 
any unsafe actions.  An  alternative style architecture is  the 
Sensor  Fusion  Effects  (SFX)  architecture,  developed  by 
Murphy and Arkin [20]. This uses a layered approach, with a 
low-level behavioural task layer, providing the functionality, 
and a top-level deliberative safety layer, which monitors the 
actions  of  the  robot  and  prevents  any  unsafe  events.  As 
Murphy [21]  discusses,  one  benefit  of  a  reasoning  safety 
layer,  is  that  the  task  of  the  controller  can  be  readily 
customised without impacting predefined safety routines.
III. OUR RESEARCH – ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
The research being discussed in this paper aims to develop 
a new safety architecture, which takes the reactive elements 
from behavioural systems and the procedural elements from 
traditional control systems. This will be used to create a new 
method for designing safety critical human-robot interactive 
systems, that can be proven and ultimately certified as safe.
By analysing the existing robot  control  architectures we 
have identified a number of strengths and weaknesses and 
have  formulated  a  criteria  based  on  these  findings.   The 
following  list  of  design  considerations  summarise  these 
criteria:
• Hierarchical  structure,  with  separate  safety  and 
control modules
• Safety modules designed to maximise re-usability and 
minimise re-testing
• Safety  modules  should  be  independent  of  task 
modules,  allowing for the task layer  to be changed, 
without compromising the safety of the robot
• Compatibility  with  any  controller  type,  i.e.  PID, 
neural network, fuzzy logic
• Appropriate  for  any  robot  hardware  comprised  of 
sensors and actuator
A. High-level Diagram
The motivation behind the design shown in figure 3.1, is 
based on a number of identified problems with other similar 
architecture types.  The design has also been developed to 
both maximise the interaction between the individual layers 
and  provide  sensor  data  to  all  layers  simultaneously.  The 
main characteristics of the design are as follows:
• Safety and task layers are separated
• Multiple safety and task layers
• Safety layer has no dependence on the task layer 
• All layers have access to sensor data
• Hierarchical  structure,  with  safety  layers  having 
highest priority
• A lower priority layer cannot affect a higher priority 
layer.
• Ability to suppress actions of lower layers (behaviour 
arbitration)
• Layers are prevented from altering data or injecting 
commands into other layers
• Event  information  is  passed  down  to  lower  layers 
(information  such  as  suppression  details,  warnings, 
advisory details)
• Event information is used for learning and adaptation
Figure 3.1: Safety control architecture.
It  is  important  to  reiterate  that  although many of  these 
design consideration are similar to the Brooks' Subsumption 
Architecture  [12],  the  ability  for  lower  layers  to  change 
upper layers will not be allowed. This is due to the assertion 
that if a safety layer was proven to be safe,  then allowing 
lower layers to make changes would invalidate the overall 
safety of that particular module.
B. Safety Layer
The  safety  layer  will  be  made  up  of  a  number  of 
behavioural  safety  modules.   An  example  of  how  safety 
policies will be implemented is shown in figure 3.2.  In this 
example  there  are  two  modules,  which  implement  safety 
policies to monitor the robot arm, wheel and gripper.  As the 
diagram illustrates, both safety modules monitor the gripper, 
therefore,  if  either  (but  not  both)  modules  fail,  safety  is 
maintained for the gripper. In addition, as the sensor input of 
each module is slightly different, a number of sensors (cam 
2,  sonar 1 or  sonar 2)  can fail,  without compromising the 
safety of the gripper.
Figure 3.2: Safety control architecture - Safety modules with redundancy.
This design has two main benefits. The first is that safety 
modules/policies can be designed for a sensor and actuator 
combination,  regardless  of  the  type  of  system  (robot  or 
otherwise), and then added to another system as a pre-tested 
and proven safety unit.  The second benefit, and the reason 
behind  using  a  module  approach,  is  the  ease  of  which 
redundancy can  be  added  to  a  system,  by  simply adding 
additional safety modules.
C. Task Layer
The task layer will implement all of the control routines 
needed to plan, organise and complete tasks. This means that 
unlike the safety layer, which is purely behavioural, the task 
layer must be deliberative, in order  to handle the complex 
tasks required for a personal robot.  At present the task layer 
specification is under development.  Although we have many 
ideas on how tasks could be dealt with, experimentation is 
required in order to make sense of this collection of ideas.
Our  current  line  of  investigation  is  looking  at  the 
possibility  of  taking  an  existing  robot  controller  and 
wrapping a safety layer around it, in order  to produce a new 
'safe'  controller.   This  would  fit  the  current  architecture 
design, as the existing controller could be integrated into the 
task layer with minimal changes.  This approach would allow 
designers to take the best parts of traditional control system 
design and combine it with the flexibility and reactive nature 
of a behavioural safety system.
IV. FUTURE WORK
We  are  currently  working  on  a  robot  simulation  tool 
which,  when complete,  will  allow us to  perform accurate 
consistent experiments with a number of robot architecture 
types.  With this tool we believe we will be able to rapidly 
develop  the  architecture  design  and  identify  any 
shortcomings.
A. Further Development to Architecture Design
The subject  of this research paper is a relatively under-
studied   area,  therefore  there  are  many  directions  this 
research  could  take.   At  present  we  are  investigating 
techniques  for  action  planning  and  sequencing.   This 
investigation  is  currently looking at  methods  proposed  by 
Hertzberg et al. [22] and Arkin and Balch [23], with focus 
particularly  on  deliberative  sequencers,  which  use  task 
information to decide the order that control actions should be 
executed.
B. Proving Design – Experiments
The  work  presented  in  this  paper  is  part  of  a  larger 
research project.  The overall goal of this research project is 
to  develop  a  new  safety  architecture,  which  can  be 
demonstrated  to  improve  the  safety,  reliability  and 
dependability of a complex robot system performing human-
robot interactive tasks.
In  order  to  test  and  evaluate  the  development  of  each 
safety architecture design, it is essential that real world tasks 
are performed. The design of these tasks will cover a wide 
range of hazardous issues that may arise while working in 
proximity to a robot. Such hazards, which must be accounted 
for include: 
Direct Hazards 
• Collision with human user
• Collision with surrounding objects
• Collision with other humans (non-user)
• Collision with robot body 
Indirect Hazards
• Dropping an object
• Causing a human to move into a dangerous situation
• Spillage while moving an object
• Burning caused by prolonged application of heat i.e. 
while ironing 
V. CONCLUSION
This  paper  has  presented  a  novel  robot  controller 
architecture  design,  which  emphasises  safety,  and 
demonstrates how a control  system can be developed with 
separate  safety  and  task  processes.   The  argument  put 
forward  by  this  paper  is  that  a  hierarchical  control 
architecture,  composed  of  low-level  deliberative  control 
modules and high-level behavioural safety modules, can be 
used  to  greatly reduce  the safety aspects  of  the controller 
design.   This  abstraction  of  safety  and  control,  allows 
designers to continually  develop and update the controller 
design, with fewer implications to the overall safety of the 
robot, when compared to a traditional controller that has no 
distinction between control and safety.
As discussed, this initial  research will be followed by a 
series of experiments.   These experiments will be used to 
both  improve  the  architecture  design  and  to  make 
quantitative comparisons with other robot controllers.
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